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Wagner: Criminal Corporate Character

CRIMINAL CORPORATE CHARACTER
Robert E. Wagner*
Abstract
In the last few years, corporations have been accused of crimes
ranging from environmental pollution on an unprecedented scale, to
manslaughter, to election tampering, to large-scale antitrust violations.
Many of these accused companies had previously committed similar
acts or even the exact same offense. Unfortunately, the rules of evidence
in the federal system and in virtually every state system prohibit the use
of this information in a prosecution for such crimes. The reasons for this
prohibition are based in historical anomalies, a mistaken understanding
of corporate function, and a misplaced anthropomorphism of the
corporation. This combination of errors has resulted in the questionable
practice of excluding relevant evidence in cases where the justifications
for exclusion are either nonexistent or weak and the benefits of
admitting the evidence clearly prevail. This Article demonstrates the
fallacies of this continued practice and argues in favor of change.
Specifically, this Article shows why evidence concerning the character
of a corporation should be allowed in criminal settings to prove that the
corporation acted in conformity with that character on the date in
question. Courts so far have not given much consideration to the
question and have simply assumed that the character evidence rules
apply to corporations. I base my objections to this practice on the goals
of corporate criminal liability, the inherent weaknesses of the character
evidence rules generally, and the way in which corporate structure
exacerbates those weaknesses. Lawyers should argue that the character
evidence rules do not apply to corporations, judges should decide
accordingly, and legislatures should amend both the Federal Rules of
Evidence and their state counterparts to make it unambiguously clear
that corporations are not covered by the same principles regarding
character as individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidentiary rules
contain a prohibition against using an individual’s past acts as evidence
of his character when prosecutors attempt to prove that the individual
behaved in a way consistent with that character in a particular instance.1
For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove that a defendant killed a
man last month, she cannot introduce evidence that he killed a different,
unrelated man last year and argue that since he is the type of person
who kills, he probably killed the second man as well. This Article
argues that this prohibition should not apply in criminal trials of
corporations. The past acts of a corporation should be admissible to add
weight to the proposition that it committed the offense in question in
conformity with its so-called character.
In making this argument, I look at two long-standing questions of
criminal law and the rules of evidence, and I examine how the
intersection of the answers to these questions should shape the treatment
of corporate character evidence. The first question deals with corporate
criminal liability and why we prosecute corporations. Prosecutions of
these types of legally created entities often result in the punishment of
real people such as investors or employees who have committed no
wrong. The second question concerns the evidence that can be used in
criminal trials generally, and specifically seeks to explore the
prohibition on the use of character evidence to show that someone acted
in conformity with his character. Why do we exclude information from
1. FED. R. EVID. 404.
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a trial that many people agree is probative and in fact everybody uses in
daily decision making? This Article argues that examining these
questions yields significant arguments for eliminating the prohibition on
the use of character evidence against corporations.
As part of this project, I employ the key insights of Professor Peter
French on the topic of corporate decision making and his explanations
of the fundamental mechanisms that underlie this process as part of a
model that he termed the Corporate Internal Decision (CID) Structure.2
I use this structure as one basis upon which to reject the application of
the character evidence rules to corporations. In addition, I also use
information relating to corporate recidivism rates and the inherent
limitations of corporate criminal penalties to support my argument.
There are multiple advantages to adopting my understanding of the
character evidence rules as they apply to corporations. These
advantages are present in two of the primary purposes of evidentiary
law: finding truth and establishing desirable incentives. I argue that the
truth-finding function is enhanced by allowing more information to be
presented to a jury in circumstances in which the evidence is likely to be
more probative than prejudicial. The advantage of establishing desirable
incentives is enhanced by the fact that using evidence of past acts
against corporations will increase the deterrent effect on them whenever
they consider criminal conduct. Other scholars have asked how legal
regimes can encourage optimal board behavior,3 but none have asked
how the rules of evidence may play a role in this incentive structure.
This Article fills that gap.
In addition to these increased advantages of allowing character
evidence against corporations as opposed to individuals, the potential
disadvantages are also reduced in the corporate context. One of the
largest and most recognized potential harms related to using character
evidence is the risk of erroneously subjecting an individual to
incarceration.4 This is not a problem here due to the fact that a
corporation obviously cannot be sentenced to imprisonment.
Furthermore, use of corporate character evidence is less likely than
individual character evidence to produce inaccurate results in the first
place. Given these increased advantages and decreased disadvantages, I
argue that it would be legitimate to exclude corporations from the
character evidence prohibition without doing so for individuals.
Part I discusses corporate criminal liability generally and reviews the
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing legal issues surrounding board size,
meeting procedures, and director liability).
4. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293–94 (N.Y. 1901) (citation omitted).
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arguments supporting and opposing it. I show that both the proponents
of expanding and those of limiting corporate criminal liability would
likely favor my proposal to change the rules of evidence. I explain the
motives behind imposing corporate criminal liability and demonstrate
how the legal system has attempted to meet those goals. Relatedly, I
will examine how the use of respondeat superior as a basis for liability
has been implemented, and why commentators have recommended
changes to existing liability standards. Part II investigates in more detail
the nature of corporations, especially their decision making processes.
After concluding this foundational inquiry regarding corporations, Part
III clarifies the character evidence rules and their prohibitions, and
discusses the arguments for and against eliminating those rules
generally. This Part also illuminates whether and how these rules are
and should be applied to corporations in the future. In this context, I
analyze not only the reasons for the rules but also the reasons for having
corporate criminal liability in the first place, as well as some of the
distinctions between people and corporations. I conclude that the
character evidence rules should be understood not to apply to
corporations in criminal prosecutions.
I. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Both the existence and appropriate level of corporate criminal
liability have been debated since its inception over a century ago.5
Before that time, corporations were not subject to the criminal law.
William Blackstone believed that this was “so obvious that it needed no
elaboration.”6 When addressing the question in 1701, American courts
held that only individuals could be charged criminally.7 In 1909, the
United States Supreme Court finally established corporate criminal
liability and used the respondeat superior principle to establish guilt in
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.8
Today, a corporation can be held criminally liable for virtually any
5. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility
in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 415 (2012); see also V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1478 n.2
(1996).
6. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2009) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476
(“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime.”)).
7. Kathleen F. Brickey, Perspectives on Corporate Criminal Liability 3 (Wash. U. in St.
Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-01-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.c
om/abstract=1980346.
8. 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see Erin Sheley,
Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 5–8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022379.
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crimes, except those requiring commission by a natural person,9 such as
rape.10 Nonetheless, the debate about corporate criminal liability rages
on, and its opponents perceive the practice “as the senseless and puerile
reaction of an ignorant public, or as an inefficient relic best replaced by
a civil scheme.”11 Why do some commentators view matters in this
light?
The main point of contention becomes not whether harm has
occurred, but rather who should pay for that harm. Some courts have
claimed that saying that a corporation has committed a wrong actually
means only that someone at a high decision making level in the
corporation has done so.12 Shareholders have virtually no say in the
management of their corporation; rather, the ultimate authority rests
with the board, and the day-to-day operations are conducted by other
corporate officials.13 Therefore, one could argue that either the
managers or employees should be held liable, but not the corporation,
and thus it is unfair to punish the shareholders by imposing criminal
penalties on the whole entity.14 A logical conclusion depending upon
how the corporation is viewed is that “corporations don’t commit
crimes, people do.”15 Hence, corporate criminal liability punishes
innocent shareholders and employees who thus become “collateral
damage.”16
This issue was raised in New York Central when the defendants
argued that punishing the corporation was actually punishing the
innocent stockholders, and that since the board could not legally
authorize criminal acts, it was impossible for the corporation as an
entity to commit a crime.17 They were potentially relying on the
historically held belief that a corporation was not capable of possessing
the moral blameworthiness necessary to perpetrate an intentional
crime.18 The Supreme Court, however, rejected these claims and held
9. A natural person has been defined as “[a] human being, as distinguished from an
artificial person created by law.” Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., 782 N.E.2d 470, 476
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted).
10. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1488.
11. Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046593.
12. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir.
1986).
13. Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern Corporations, Corporate
Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617, 629 (2010).
14. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and
Criminal Law, 19. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2010).
15. Brickey, supra note 7, at 2.
16. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1359.
17. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909).
18. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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that since a corporation acts through its officers and agents, their
purposes, motivations, and intentions are also those of the corporation.19
This established the use of respondeat superior, a principle of liability
from tort law, as a viable criminal law theory. After New York Central,
commentators objected that corporate criminal liability ran against the
purpose of criminal law, that is, “punishment of the morally
blameworthy—because it relied upon vicarious guilt rather than
personal fault.”20 Others felt that the respondeat superior standard for
criminal liability was “overly broad.”21 For instance, under some
circumstances the federal government and a number of states impose
liability on the corporation for the actions of any employee, even if the
employee was instructed not to perform the action or if the corporation
was a victim.22 Some corporate convictions have been based on
seemingly individual actions, with catastrophic results for the
corporation and its employees (such as the collapse of Arthur Anderson,
which resulted in the loss of 85,000 jobs) that are not rectified even if
the conviction is later reversed.23 The current practice of conviction
without reference to corporate character reduces the amount of
intentionality that can legitimately be ascribed to the conduct, which
blurs the line between civil and criminal liability and dilutes the impact
of criminal convictions.24 By not using corporate intent, we “squander[]
the power of the criminal law.”25
Professors Daniel Fischel and Alan Sykes have argued that corporate
criminal liability is unnecessary and in fact can lead to overdeterrence,
whereby corporations spend more money avoiding crime than they
should.26 Nonetheless, while corporations are a necessary part of
modern life and bring many advantages, they also have the ability to
cause great harm.27 With the exception of governments, corporations are
the most powerful institutions in the world, and are sometimes even
more powerful than governments.28 Corporate actions and policies have
CRIME & JUSTICE 259, 259 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
19. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 492–93.
20. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1485 (citations omitted).
21. Sheley, supra note 8, at 4.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
23. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364–66.
24. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1100 (1991).
25. Id. at 1183–84.
26. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321
(1996).
27. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 2.
28. Goforth, supra note 13, at 618 (citation omitted).
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contributed to, if not caused, many environmental and other types of
disasters.29 Corporations are capable of committing crimes far in excess
of what individuals can achieve due to their size, resources, and
complexity.30 Those who argue in favor of criminal sanctions for
corporations identify the harms that corporate misconduct can cause,
mention the “expressive value of punishing corporations,” and argue
that in light of societal perceptions, failing to punish corporations could
“delegitimiz[e] the criminal law.”31 Corporate criminal liability may be
appropriate due to the “collective qualities” of corporations—that is,
their “geographic, structural, and temporal complexities”—that amplify
the potential harm caused and thereby justify criminal liability.32
Professor Pamela Bucy also argues that we should criminalize corporate
behavior due not only to the large amount of harm corporations can
cause, but also the “unique opportunities for unlawful behavior” arising
from corporations’ organizational structures.33
Other commentators have stated that corporations are just legal
fictions that refer to the people and agreements behind the organizations
and, therefore, any liability should attach to these individuals.34 Yet this
understanding has been objected to on several different grounds,
including the observation that corporations have cultures that differ
from those of the individuals in them.35 Furthermore, due to the nature
of a large corporation and possible complexity of its various hierarchies,
it can be difficult to determine which one individual may have violated
the law.36 Just prosecuting individuals for their acts can be problematic
from an incentives perspective, not only because it may be difficult to
identify the persons responsible for the criminal action, but also because
it may not be possible to overcome the internal pressures created by the
corporation.37
In some situations it is not individuals alone who perpetrate the
crimes, but rather a corporation’s standard operating procedure or a part
of its business strategy plays a role in it.38 A corporation’s culture and
29. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 119 (2009).
30. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2009).
31. Sheley, supra note 8, at 3 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2009).
34. See Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 15.
35. See id. at 15–16.
36. Brickey, supra note 7, at 22.
37. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1119.
38. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 30, at 1484 (citing the engineering giant Siemens’
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customs can, to varying degrees, affect individuals’ attitudes and
behaviors.39 Attributing the criminal behavior of corporations to the
individual alone may disregard the institutional processes occurring
within the organization.40 Corporate culture and organizational structure
can influence individual decision making in many relevant ways.41 It
has long been acknowledged that the policies of some corporations can
encourage criminal behavior.42 One infamous example of corporate
misconduct clearly related to corporate character was Big Tobacco’s
long-time pattern of misleading regulators and the public about the
health risks involved in smoking.43 Sometimes “it is appropriate not to
ask ‘What was going on with those people to make them act that way?’
but instead to ask ‘What was going on in that organization that made
people act that way?’”44 When dealing with an organization, it is not
enough for discrete individuals to exercise self-control; rather, control
must be part of the organization.45
Corporate criminal liability has also been defended as an appropriate
“expression of the community’s moral judgment.”46 The idea is that if
we do not hold a corporation criminally liable when people think we
should, then the criminal justice system itself will be weakened due to
appearances of favoritism and unequal application of the law.47
Furthermore, people do seem to experience “greater moral indignation
toward corporations than toward natural persons for the same crimes.”48
A final argument in favor of corporate criminal liability is based on the
fact that corporations that adhere to the law are sometimes at a
competitive disadvantage compared to corporations that disregard the
systemic use of bribes as one example).
39. Ripken, supra note 29, at 103.
40. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Responsibility: It’s All About
Power, 41 STETSON L. REV. 97, 110 (2011).
41. See Goforth, supra note 13, at 634 (identifying increased risk taking, team playing at
the expense of good judgment, and cutting corners).
42. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 58 (2006).
43. See generally Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces
that Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387
(1999).
44. Goforth, supra note 13, at 648 (citation omitted).
45. Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of
Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
46. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (2009).
47. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 56.
48. Id. at 57; see also Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The
Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 792
(2000) (“People often search for group rather than individual-level causes for extremely
negative events.”).
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law.49 If we did not have criminal sanctions, these law-abiding
corporations would be placed at an even greater disadvantage.
The availability of civil corrective measures further complicates the
question of the appropriateness of criminal sanctions. Some scholars
think that corporate misconduct can be controlled through civil
enforcement while others believe that civil fines cannot replicate the
reputational harm of criminal sanctions.50 Furthermore, some find the
unpredictability associated with reputational damage stemming from a
criminal conviction to be advantageous,51 whereas others view this
advantage as lessened by “imprecision and lack of uniformity.”52 Even
though objections to criminal sanctions remain, commentators and
practitioners who favor them have claimed that prosecution of
corporations should actually be simplified.53 To understand this debate,
it is best to take a step back and examine in more detail the general
goals that criminal sanctions are intended to achieve.
A. The Purpose of Corporate Criminal Liability
The classic goals of criminal law are deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation.54 The United States Supreme Court
has held not only that deterrence is an appropriate purpose of criminal
liability, but also that corporations can appropriately be considered
blameworthy and, therefore, retribution would be another justification
for corporate criminal liability.55 The expression of condemnation is
another possible purpose of criminal law. There is clearly a wide range
of levels of condemnation for various criminal acts, but some
condemnation is consistently present and many have argued that this
expression has a value beyond any deterrent effect that may be
associated with it.56 A possible goal of criminal law is to both convey
49. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 942
(2005).
50. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 512–16 (2006).
51. See id. at 514.
52. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 42.
53. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 30, at 1482.
54. Brickey, supra note 7, at 14; Sheley, supra note 8, at 6.
55. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975).
56. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 5; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (arguing that the public wants
to see condemnation of both individuals and corporations through the criminal law and that
imposing criminal sanctions therefore increases public welfare). For a discussion of the
expressive function of criminal liability in the intellectual property context, see Irina D. Manta,
The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
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society’s feelings of condemnation for certain types of behavior and
help shape those feelings.57 Arguments are often made, however, that
neither expression nor retribution are proper goals. Many scholars and
judges treat deterrence as the goal for corporate criminal liability,58 and
some scholars have even claimed that the “chief civilized purpose of
criminal law is deterrence.”59
Deterrence can be broken down into both general and specific
deterrence. The idea of general deterrence is that punishing one person
or entity will convince other people or entities not to behave in the same
manner.60 Unlike general deterrence, specific deterrence is aimed at the
actual person or institution that committed the offense and attempts to
prevent that entity from committing the same or similar acts in the
future.61 To argue from a deterrence perspective, we need to show that
corporate criminal liability deters more than individual liability alone.62
In this context, it is important to understand the specific factors that
affect decision making behavior. In a survey of corporate ethics,
“superiors” were ranked as the most important contributing factor to
criminal or unethical decision making.63 In that spirit, criminal liability
is supposed to “stimulat[e] a maximum effort” on the parts of owners
and managers in their responsibility to direct their numerous agents in
compliance with the law.64
In that same spirit of maximizing utility, “[a] judge’s goal in
punishing a corporation should be to induce a level of monitoring that
will prevent more criminal harm than the monitoring will cost.”65
Corporate liability may thus also be thought of as a way to induce
internal monitoring as opposed to serving only as an external
constraint.66 Furthermore, the problem of corporate crime is seemingly
contagious and, for example, in the last decade just about every major
pharmaceutical company has been charged and has pled guilty or agreed
to a settlement based upon serious misconduct.67 While potentially
469, 494 (2011).
57. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law
as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990).
58. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 5, at 1494 & nn.91–93.
59. Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 833
(1927).
60. Brickey, supra note 7, at 14.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1494–95.
63. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 42, at 59.
64. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972)
65. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1360.
66. Id.
67. Beale, supra note 30, at 1484 (citation omitted).
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overstating the problem, the U.S. Supreme Court made a relevant point
when it said that “to give [corporations] immunity from all punishment
because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually
controlling the subject matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”68
Today, there are many administrative agencies and extended civil
liability that could work to curtail corporate misconduct.
Notwithstanding this fact, criminal liability has not only survived but
has actually increased dramatically.69 This is in part because of its
capability to simultaneously achieve “consequential, retributive and
expressive benefits.”70 Whichever purpose (or combination of purposes)
we choose, we are still left with the question of how optimally to
achieve it via the toolkit of corporate criminal liability.
B. Achieving the Goals of Corporate Criminal Liability
After New York Central, whenever corporations were prosecuted,
courts used respondeat superior to establish liability without much
additional analysis.71 In New York Central, the statute had explicitly
stated that a corporation could be held liable.72 After the Supreme
Court’s ruling, however, lower courts began reading other criminal
statutes as though they applied to corporations whether there was any
indication that the legislature had intended them to do so or not.73 Under
the respondeat superior standard, a corporation can be held criminally
liable if three conditions are satisfied: (1) an agent of the corporation
acted with the requisite mental state, (2) the agent acted within the
scope of his employment, and (3) the agent intended to benefit the
corporation.74
Some federal courts have imposed liability upon a corporation based
on a theory of collective mens rea, where no specific individual had that
mens rea, resulting in company liability even though no culpable
individual could be identified.75 Indeed, all of the elements of criminal
corporate liability are easily met for a variety of reasons. For example,
an agent can act within the scope of employment even though the
68. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909).
69. Baer, supra note 14, at 4.
70. Id. at 2.
71. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364.
72. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 491.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1909); London v.
Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); People v. Star Co., 120 N.Y.S. 498,
500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914).
74. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1489–90.
75. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational
Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 501 (1996).
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corporation had forbidden the wrongful conduct. Furthermore, the agent
could have intended to “benefit the corporation” when that was not his
only motivation and he had ultimately not benefitted the corporation at
all.76 Nevertheless, some argue that even potentially excessive
prosecutions of a corporation, which punish it for employee actions that
are against its publicized policy, can help to deter such acts and
encourage the corporation to implement effective measures rather than
empty policy declarations.77 The fear is that a corporation can impose
seemingly good compliance programs without actually affecting the
culture or the desire to comply with the law.78 In recognition of this
possibility, courts usually do not acknowledge even extensive
compliance programs as a defense to the illegal conduct, even if it was
committed by only one employee.79
Nevertheless, as desirable as avoiding criminal behavior may be,
extreme penalties can cause overdeterrence and lead to an excessive
increase in corporate resources devoted to enforcement.80 Furthermore,
when convicted—or possibly even only accused—of a crime, a
corporation can suffer significant consequences in addition to the
criminal charges or fines themselves, including loss of the ability to
conduct the business in which it had been involved and a significant
negative impact on its stock prices and other business opportunities it
may have had.81 Some scholars, legislators, and practitioners have
recognized this danger and have argued for limiting the scope of
liability to actions that can be traced to people high up in the
corporation such as executive managers or members of the board of
directors.82 For example, Australia has passed legislation imposing new
forms of liability that focus on the culture of the corporation or the
inadequate management rather than on the simpler respondeat superior
approach.83 Similarly, some English laws require a corporate “alter
ego,” usually meaning a high-up official in the corporation.84

76. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1490. Practically speaking, prosecutors do consider whether
or not it was a “rogue” employee who committed the crime or if the culture of the corporation
contributed to the offense. Baer, supra note 14, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Sheley, supra note 8, at 8.
77. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 53, 55–56 & n.6 (1986).
78. Ramirez, supra note 49, at 965.
79. Brickey, supra note 7, at 9.
80. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 26, at 325–26.
81. Beale, supra note 30, at 1501–02.
82. Sheley, supra note 8, at 8.
83. Beale, supra note 30, at 1493.
84. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1491 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Domestically, the Model Penal Code (MPC), along with some states,
only imposes liability on corporations based upon the actions of highlevel managers or the board of directors—and even then, only when
they were acting on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of
their employment.85 The MPC’s focus on high-level managers places an
additional requirement upon the respondeat superior liability
framework, with the idea that these managers’ actions would then
represent the policy of the corporation.86 Yet three problems with the
MPC formulation have been identified: (1) it is too broad because highlevel managers may still be acting on their own, (2) a corporate policy
that results in a low-level employee’s committing a crime would not
result in liability for the corporation, and (3) it gives high-level
managers an incentive to remain unaware of criminal conduct.87 To
correct these issues, Professor Bucy has argued that corporate culture
should be taken into account and should give corporations a good faith
defense to criminal conduct that may have been committed by one of
their employees.88 Her position is that simple respondeat superior
liability does not encourage law-abiding behavior and “fails to
distinguish between those that are culpable and those that are not.”89
Professor Bucy believes that corporate liability should rest on a
corporate “ethos,” or corporate personality, and require that this ethos
have encouraged the commission of the criminal act.90 She proposes
using the past acts of the corporation to establish this ethos.91 Other
commentators have gone so far as to argue that past conduct should
result in increased penalties to the point of corporate death for repeat
offenders.92
Whatever one’s view of corporate criminal liability, it is unlikely to
be eliminated, as can be surmised from the fact that no Attorney
General in the last century has sought to narrow corporate criminal
liability standards.93 Nonetheless, even among those who argue in favor
of corporate criminal liability, there is a call for an increased
requirement showing a “pervasive criminal intent throughout the
corporate entity, in order to better justify finding the ‘corporate person’
collectively liable for criminal misconduct.”94 Similarly, on the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
See Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1104–05.
Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 33, at 1441–42.
Id.
Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1099.
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1379 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 49, at 972–73.
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1387.
Sheley, supra note 8, at 46.
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opposing side, commentators who generally think corporate crime is a
problematic issue agree that if liability is to be imposed, it should be
upon those companies whose criminal conduct is genuinely “corporate”
rather than individual in nature.95 Furthermore, most would agree that in
the law, a paramount goal is that like actors should be treated alike and
different actors should be treated differently.96 The question for the
purposes of this Article is what does it mean for two corporations to be
“alike?” To answer this question, we again need to step back and ask
what our conception of a corporation is in the first place.
C. Corporations and Personhood
It was pointed out almost a hundred years ago that juries are more
likely to find corporations guilty than they are to find individuals guilty,
and it is worthwhile to examine why.97 This state of affairs is unlikely to
arise from corporations’ all being malevolent. As it happens, many early
corporations were explicitly benevolent institutions, including several
new church congregations.98 At their root, corporations exist because
some endeavors require joint efforts and can only be achieved with
many individuals participating. If the activities of large numbers of
people are properly coordinated, the result can be far superior to the
sum of what the individuals contributed.99 One of the challenges that
have arisen as a result, however, has been to define this new collective
entity and answer whether or not it is a “person.”
There are at least three different ways that a corporation can be
viewed as a person: a moral person, a natural person, and a legal
person.100 A corporation clearly is not a natural person, clearly is a legal
person, and arguably is a moral person that should be “held morally
accountable for its actions.”101 At the same time, Justice John Paul
Stevens has stated that “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs,
no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]heir ‘personhood’ often
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of
‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was
established.”102 In a similar vein, many assert that corporations cannot
95. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 26, at 325.
96. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1100 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAWS 155 (1961)).
97. See Edgerton, supra note 59, at 834–35.
98. See Goforth, supra note 13, at 625.
99. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1999).
100. Kim, supra note 48, at 784.
101. Id.
102. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decide, act, or intend on their own, and that these functions are simply
accomplished through their human members, without whom it would
have no identity or any ability to function.103 One possible criticism of
this view of the corporation as an extension of the humans involved is
the fact that a corporation can live for several generations without
changing even if every human involved has changed.104 It would seem
then that it cannot merely be an extension.
Historically, it has been disputed whether the corporation is an entity
beyond the people involved and its legal status.105 Chief Justice John
Marshall described one view of corporations in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward: 106 “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it . . . .”107 Another view supported early on by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co.108 was that a corporation has rights and duties conferred
upon it due to the rights and duties of its human members.109 Today, it
is established that corporations are treated in many ways as though they
were natural people. For example, they can own property, participate in
binding legal contracts, can be sued in court (and in turn sue others),
and can be prosecuted and held responsible for criminal actions.110 This
does not mean, however, that they should always be treated the same as
natural people. This Article argues that evidence law should draw a
crucial distinction between individuals and corporations when it comes
to how it treats character.
II. CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
It is important here to first lay some groundwork on the nature of
corporations and their functioning, beginning with corporate decision
making. One problem in this area stems from the fact that corporate
conduct is undertaken by people with different and possibly conflicting
motivations, which can at times result in actions being taken that are not
profit maximizing for the corporation.111 This is due in part to the fact
103. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 29, at 100.
104. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 1 (1962).
105. Ripken, supra note 29, at 100.
106. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
107. Id. at 636.
108. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
109. Id. at 396 (citing oral arguments).
110. Brickey, supra note 7, at 2.
111. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 36.
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that people do not always follow economic considerations,112 but rather
sometimes make decisions for various reasons ranging from legal
obligations to self-interest to the maintenance of social relationships.113
Even at the level of shareholders, who presumably have aligned general
goals of making money, there can be a variance in areas like risk
tolerance (possibly due to age and retirement considerations) or tax
implications.114 Because people in a corporation hope to maximize their
joint efforts, however, they are often willing to give up individual
control and defer to an agreed-upon decision making hierarchy.115
Consequently, shareholders have almost no power to make day-today decisions in the corporations they own.116 The official power in a
corporation resides with the board of directors.117 Further, most boards
act in an advisory capacity and oversee the upper-level managers who
typically run operations on a daily basis.118 Rather than describing a
corporation as a group of individuals, it is more accurate to say that it is
a hierarchy of teams, with a specific team—the board of directors—at
the top.119 In most corporations, disagreements are raised to the next
level of the hierarchy, with the ultimate arbitration ability residing with
the board of directors.120 Major decisions in a corporation evolve
through many different individuals who integrate their knowledge and
individual decisions into the structure of the corporation.121 Given this,
the decisions (and ultimately the character) of a corporation can be
distinguished from those of any individual.122 The vast majority of
decisions “are made collegially among team members at lower levels”
of the corporation.123 Some commentators have argued that corporations
may be more capable than humans of acting in a purposeful, rational,
and calculating manner,124 and some studies have shown that groups
make better decisions than the average individuals in the group and in
fact make better decisions than the best individual in the group.125
112. See Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 315–19.
113. See id.
114. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just
Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 91 (2005).
115. See Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 275–77.
116. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 4.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 279.
121. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 221–22 (3d ed. 1976).
122. Id. at 221.
123. Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 282.
124. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 29, at 128.
125. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 12. But see David Schkade et al., Deliberating About
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Under some circumstances, groups also make decisions faster than
individuals.126
Once we have established that, rather than individuals, it is a team or
group making decisions, the next question of interest is how the group
goes about doing so. In varied settings, corporations are likely to
develop many different specific ways of making decisions.127 “One
model
of
organizational
decisionmaking
views
corporate
decisionmaking as essentially a political bargaining process where
several individuals or teams of individuals in the corporation may be
involved in the making of a single business decision.”128 Therefore,
given the complexities of this process, the final corporate action may
not be the one that any specific person would have chosen
individually.129 “All organizations must have some mechanism for
aggregating the preferences of the organization’s constituencies and
converting them into collective decisions.”130 One of the most
prominent models of corporate decision making is the Corporation
Internal Decision (CID) Structure.131 In this understanding, every
corporation has a CID Structure:132
CID Structures have two elements of interest to us here:
(1) an organizational or responsibility flow chart that
delineates stations and levels within the corporate power
structure and (2) corporate decision recognition rule(s)
(usually embedded in something called “corporation
policy”). The CID Structure is the personnel organization
for the exercise of the corporation’s power with respect to
its ventures, and as such its primary function is to draw
experience from various levels of the corporation into a
decision-making and ratification process.133
The CID Structure allows information and positions developed by
human individuals to be synthesized and turned into a decision by the
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2000) (describing the potentially
distorting effect of group polarization on jury decisions in tort law). For a discussion of the
literature on the individual decision making of judges versus the group decision making of
juries, see generally Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012).
126. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 12–14 & nn.46–47.
127. See Metzger & Dalton, supra note 75, at 551–52.
128. Kim, supra note 48, at 789 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 790.
130. Bainbridge, supra note 114, at 90.
131. See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211
(1979).
132. See id. at 212.
133. Id.
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corporate entity, permitting different inputs and perspectives to come
together for a common goal.134 The goals of corporations and
individuals are often similar, and to the extent there is a difference, it
tends to arise from the aims of corporations being more stable and less
varied than those of individuals.135 “The collective nature of the
corporation’s decision-making system transforms the individual inputs,
making the individual intentions and actions unrecognizable when the
final corporate intention is formulated.”136 Given the CID Structure,
corporate decision making must be more transparent than individual
thoughts or choices because communication between many different
entities has to occur before a corporate decision can be reached.
III. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
A. The Nature of Character Evidence
“For at least two centuries, both English and American courts have
generally prohibited the use of character evidence as circumstantial
proof that a person engaged in a particular conduct . . . .”137 Here, I will
briefly delineate the common understandings of “character” and what
evidence is allowed versus what evidence is prohibited. According to
Professors Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick, “‘character’
means a person’s disposition or propensity to engage or not engage in
various forms of conduct.”138 Character evidence has also been
described as information, not about a fact currently at issue in the
litigation, but rather about the person’s or entity’s past conduct.139 Other
related definitions of character are “a human being’s propensity to
engage in a general type of conduct”140 and an “internal operating
system” that influences a person’s behavior.141 This could be seen as
very similar to a CID Structure in corporations.142 As applied in
evidence law, “character” has also been described as “a collection of
‘traits,’ each a self-contained packet of potential conduct consistent with
134. Id.
135. Id. at 214.
136. Ripken, supra note 29, at 127.
137. David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of
the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1164–65 (1998).
138. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 182 (4th ed. 2009).
139. Chris Chambers Goodman, The Gate(way)s of Hell and Pathways to Purgatory:
Eradicating Common Law Protections in the Newly Sculpted Character Evidence Rules of the
United Kingdom’s 2003 Criminal Justice Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 82 (2011).
140. Richard C. Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure,
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 124 (1987).
141. Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See supra Part II.
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previously observed reactions to events, people, or things.”143 Or
character could simply be defined as a collection of traits and
dispositions.144 Even though the exact definition of character may be
elusive, we do have a sense of the concept, which boils down to a
general impression of what a person is like. This brings us to the matter
of what evidence law prohibits in this regard.
Rules limiting the use of character evidence exist in virtually every
jurisdiction in the United States.145 Federal Rule of Evidence 404 states:
“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion . . . .”146 This rule is read in conjunction with
Rule 405, which establishes three types of character evidence one can
introduce at times: (1) testimony about a person’s reputation in the
community for a specific character trait, (2) a witness’s opinion about a
character trait, and (3) specific instances of conduct that demonstrate the
person’s character.147 Evidence prohibited for seeking to prove action in
conformity with a certain character may be admissible under a different
theory,148 for example, to show that the person had the necessary
knowledge or required intent.149 When admitted for some other purpose,
however, it is subject to objection, increased appellate scrutiny, and
limited use in argument. An example of the character evidence rule in
practice would be the prosecution in an aggravated battery case wanting
to introduce evidence that the defendant has previously shown his
violent character and has on more than one occasion seriously injured
other people. The prosecution wants to argue that because of this
history, the defendant is more likely to have committed the battery in
the case at bar. The rules of evidence would, however, generally
prohibit this.150
Other countries have greatly relaxed the prohibition on character
evidence,151 and since the Federal Rules of Evidence were passed in
143. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 849 (1982) (citation omitted).
144. See Tillers, supra note 141, at 783.
145. See Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What Was Done”: When to Admit Character
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV 939, 941 & n.7 (2001).
146. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
147. Kim, supra note 48, at 768.
148. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character
Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 575 (1990); FED R. EVID. 404(b).
149. Kim, supra note 48, at 810.
150. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
151. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 602 & n.187
(identifying the United Kingdom as one example).
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1975, Congress has significantly amended them several times.152 The
most important amendment dealing with character evidence was in
1994, when Congress changed the rules to allow character evidence in
cases dealing with sexual misconduct or child molestation.153
Specifically, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 allow the use
of character evidence to show action in conformity with that character
in cases involving sexual assault or child molestation.154 Character
evidence is also used at various specific times in criminal proceedings
for sentencing and determining punitive damages.155 In fact, specific
instances of past misconduct are used in various ways and at different
times throughout a trial, perhaps most importantly to determine the
severity of the penalty. In federal court, the rules of evidence (including
those on character evidence) are specifically not applicable during
sentencing,156 and the well-known “three strikes” laws drastically
increase a defendant’s potential punishment based entirely upon his past
conduct.157
It has been claimed that “[t]he admissibility of uncharged
misconduct evidence is the single most important issue in contemporary
criminal evidence law.”158 In some jurisdictions, improper admission of
uncharged misconduct is the most common ground for appeals and the
most frequent ground for reversals.159 Given that uncharged misconduct
is possibly the most contentious of the character evidence rules, it is
helpful to examine what has led to the exclusion of this kind of
information.
B. Arguments Against Admitting Character Evidence
“[C]haracter evidence is often very probative.”160 There is a risk,
however, that juries will give character evidence more weight than it
deserves.161 On the other hand, some scholars have gone as far as

152. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM L.
REV. 1227, 1231–32 n.4 (2001).
153. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1162.
154. FED. R. EVID. 413 (sexual assault); FED. R. EVID. 414 (child molestation); FED. R.
EVID. 415 (both).
155. Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1233.
156. See id. at 1268 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines only consider a
defendant’s criminal history category and offense characteristics).
157. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2006);
CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1170.12 (Deering 2013) (outlining California’s Three Strikes Law).
158. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 576 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 577.
160. Tillers, supra note 141, at 792.
161. Id.
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arguing that the probative value of character evidence is actually low.162
Given the very low standard necessary for evidence to be considered
relevant enough to be admitted,163 that alone would likely not be a
sufficient bar even if true.164 The starting point for judging the validity
of this prohibition is the idea that it is fundamental to American
jurisprudence “that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for
who he is.”165 In Michelson v. United States,166 the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out that the rule against character evidence is based upon the
fact that in our system, a man cannot be convicted and sent to prison
simply because he is “a bad man.”167 Similarly, an old principle in
American courts is that “a person should not be judged strenuously by
reference to the awesome spectre of his past life.”168 This basic
objection to admitting character evidence is only the beginning.
There are several more specific justifications for the ban on character
evidence.169 One commonly mentioned reason is that jurors will
overvalue character evidence and jump to an incorrect conclusion about
the specific charge once they learn that the defendant has committed
other bad acts.170 A good example of this justification is the often
repeated saying “[o]nce a thief, always a thief.”171 As mentioned, the
fear is that “jurors might give character evidence undeserved weight,”172
particularly giving too much weight to dispositions or personality traits
and not enough weight to specific situational factors.173 The danger is
potentially even greater when the defendant was accused but not
convicted of a previous crime, since the jury may feel that the defendant
should be punished for not only the current but also past offenses.174
This exacerbates the possibility that a juror will decide that the
defendant deserves punishment because he is a bad person as opposed
162. Id. at 783 (citation omitted).
163. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
164. Tillers, supra note 141, at 783.
165. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977).
166. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
167. Id. at 489 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
168. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1162 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
169. See Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 587; Miguel A. Méndez,
The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 223–24
(1996).
170. Kim, supra note 48, at 772.
171. Id. at 772.
172. Miguel A. Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered: “People Do Not Seem to Be
Predictable Characters,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 881 (1998).
173. Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1243.
174. See Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 561 (1984).
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to because he committed the current offense.175
Also, with character evidence, a previous defendant may be
investigated and charged because the police knew about his initial
crime, which the jury may not realize.176 Therefore, the jury is left with
the impression that it is very unlikely that a man would be randomly
suspected of a crime by the police when a year ago, he had committed
the exact same crime.177 Jurors would ask themselves: “If this were a
mistake and this person had not committed this crime, what are the odds
that he would be prosecuted for it and coincidentally had, in fact,
committed the very same crime a year previously?” Logically, they may
conclude that such a result is outside the realm of probability. Rather,
they would think that this only makes sense because it is not a mistake
and this person is being charged now and was convicted then because
he repeatedly does the same thing. Yet, this entire train of thought may
be erroneous because the police, knowing about the previous crime,
may have used that information to suspect him in the first place. The
answer to the question of probability is, therefore, that the odds of this
happening are very high!
Another series of objections to using character evidence comes from
the notion that character evidence is only probative “if we assume that
character traits are relatively stable and that people generally act in
conformity” with those traits.178 The prevalent consensus used to be that
people have character traits that remain fairly consistent.179 Some
psychologists, however, have questioned the stability of personality
traits due to the lack of empirical evidence to support their existence.180
Hence, psychologists began to doubt the personality trait theory and
developed the belief that behavior is much more dependent on specific
situational circumstances.181 If true, the criticisms of the idea that
personality traits are stable would be a strong reason for questioning the
relevance of character evidence for individuals, particularly given most
jurors’ strong instinctual reaction to such evidence.182 When the Federal
Rules of Evidence were being drafted, the then-relatively new theory
now called “situationism,” which viewed environmental factors as the
175. Kim, supra note 48, at 772.
176. See Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 273 (1995).
177. Id.
178. Kim, supra note 48, at 770.
179. Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered, supra note 172, at 877.
180. Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 227.
181. Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered, supra note 172, 878. These studies and
conclusions were based on individual persons and not corporations. Id.
182. Id. at 878–79.
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major determinants of a person’s conduct, predominated.183 That theory
posited that one problem with the reliability of personality traits is the
seemingly tiny amount of situational difference that can cause a person
to act in disparate ways.184 Given the near impossibility of observing the
decision making process and the number of variables in the human
decision making process, situationism argued that it is difficult to
develop an accurate or predictive character profile.185 These arguments
helped shape the rules of evidence that we see today.
Courts also exclude this type of evidence due to its complicating
effect and the potential for jury confusion.186 Judicial efficiency is
another argument against character evidence, in that allowing it could
cause a court to get unnecessarily entangled in the specifics of the
parties’ past lives.187 If character evidence were allowed generally,
some argue that “trials would turn into contests about which party has
the better charitable record.”188 Nonetheless, some of these concerns are
not very forceful due to the fact that the court still has the ability to limit
evidence under the general rules related to prejudice and probative
value.189 Not only are there several objections to the admission of
character evidence generally, but some individuals have attacked the
rules allowing character evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases on the grounds that there is no real distinction
between those defendants and other potential defendants that would
justify unequal treatment.190
C. Arguments for Admitting Character Evidence
Arguments for banning character evidence notwithstanding, there are
many reasons that support allowing it. First, one of the foundational
goals of evidence law is accuracy,191 because its lack could result in
great inefficiency, massive costs on parties and society, the undermining
of notice and participation, unpredictability, failures to guide and deter
conduct, violations of substantive rights, and the risk of political
183. Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of
Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 514–15 (1991).
184. Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 228.
185. See Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered, supra note 172, at 879–80.
186. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1185.
187. Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1249.
188. Bexar Cnty. Appraisal Review Bd. v. First Baptist Church, 846 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1993).
189. Id.
190. Colb, supra note 145, at 942.
191. See Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060340.
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illegitimacy.192 The two fundamental tenets of evidence law are that we
should exclude irrelevant evidence and admit relevant evidence unless
there is a good reason to exclude it.193 Even the courts on rare occasion
express disdain for character evidence rules and acknowledge the
relevance of the excluded information.194 “[T]he logical relevance of
uncharged misconduct is . . . undeniable.”195 Everybody uses characterbased reasoning daily.196 When someone decides whom to trust to fix
his car, watch his children, or invest his money, what information does
he want to know? Presumably, he would like to find out what happened
the last time a given individual performed these activities. The
popularity of review websites in which the main purpose is to see how a
particular business performed in the past adds more weight to the
contention that as a society, we value knowledge about past behavior
and use it as a future predictor.197 Hence, when it comes to everyday
life, we very much tend to see the past as relevant.
In that sense, an increased use of character evidence would allow
jurors to use their common sense in determining what information is
useful to arrive at their verdicts.198 Wholly relying on character
evidence would be inappropriate,199 but that does not alter the fact that it
does sometimes change the equation and make the possibility that
someone committed an act more or less likely.200 Evidence can be
incomplete, inaccurate, or both. At the same time, “by gathering and
putting together enough evidentiary traces, ambiguities can be canceled,
distortions can be revealed and discounted, and a fair similitude of the
past event can be achieved.”201 Relatedly, some of the psychological
theories that were relied upon when the Federal Rules of Evidence were
drafted are no longer as trusted. Recent psychological theories have
suggested that a combination of traits and specific aspects of situations
can lead to predictable conduct.202 Today, many psychologists agree
192. Id.
193. Id. at 13.
194. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1172 (identifying Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401
(N.H. 1872), as one example).
195. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character
Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 289 (1994).
196. Id.; Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 222.
197. For a discussion of the role of such websites, see Irina D. Manta, Privatizing
Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 416–17 (2009).
198. Goodman, supra note 139, at 120.
199. Virtually nobody would take the position that because someone committed an act in
the past, she must be the person who committed the act currently in question.
200. See Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1242.
201. Uviller, supra note 143, at 847 (citation omitted).
202. See Davies, supra note 183, at 517–20.
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that people do have cross-situational attributes that, when combined
with factors in specific situations, help determine what a person will
do.203 In essence, the rules regarding the exclusion of character evidence
are at least in part based upon “questionable assumptions about human
nature.”204
There are three additional reasons to allow character evidence. First,
allowing character evidence would increase the disincentives of
recidivists, because they would know that they have an increased
likelihood of conviction due to the admission of prior misconduct
evidence.205 The second additional argument is that, as has been noted
by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the problem of surprise
(and many of the other objections to character evidence) could be dealt
with both via notice requirements and the general rule that evidence can
be excluded if it would create “unfair prejudice.”206 The third argument,
which has been endorsed by some courts, is the low likelihood that an
innocent individual will be charged with a crime when he had
coincidentally committed the same crime months or years ago, and that
this increases the appropriateness of admitting the past evidence.207
Nonetheless, as mentioned above,208 this may ignore the possibility that
the past act was why the defendant was suspected and charged in the
first place.
Due to these arguments, many scholars have recommended allowing
the limited use of character evidence because they hope to maximize the
amount of probative evidence and minimize unfair prejudice.209
Professor Richard Uviller may have said it best over thirty years ago:
Predisposition, so long a pariah in the law of evidence,
must be reclaimed from the shadows. Its inference has been
persistent and ineradicable because our common experience
informs us that evidence of predisposition is probative. But
our Victorian sensibilities have demanded denial, and so
the influence of the banished force has been devious and
distorted. If we hope to achieve rules that make sense, and
if we hope to write rules to enhance the accuracy of the
fact-finding process, we should abandon our frayed

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1233.
Wydick, supra note 140, at 125.
Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task, supra note 195, at 294.
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note; Leonard, supra note 137, at 1185 n.103.
E.g., Cleveland v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 65 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
See supra Section III.B.
See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 143, at 885.
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pretense concerning the value of character evidence.210
Clinging to these Victorian sensibilities involves an elevated possibility
of creating distortion when they are applied to a criminal concept not in
effect until after that era.
D. Applying Character Evidence Rules to Corporations
It is currently unclear whether a corporation’s past misconduct can
be admitted to show the corporation’s bad character and that it acted in
conformity with that character on a specific occasion.211 Most courts
simply assume that Rule 404 applies to corporations without analyzing
the merits of that position.212 Several courts in various settings have
extended the character evidence ban to corporations and other groups.
For example, when one court barred potential character evidence from
being used against a nonhuman entity (in this case, a union), it stated:
“[E]vidence of a trait of a person’s character with respect to care or skill
is inadmissible to prove the quality of his conduct on a specified
occasion.”213 The court never discussed the fact that it was applying the
rule to an organization rather than a person. Another example of a court
excluding character evidence in this context can be seen in American
National Watermattress Corp. v. Manville,214 where the Alaska
Supreme Court applied the character evidence prohibition to a
corporation even though the corporation’s counsel had not specifically
requested this.215
In federal court, questions stem in part from the facts that the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not define person and that the term is used in an
inconsistent manner.216 Some courts have stated that a corporation has
no character,217 and there is no consensus on behalf of courts,
commentators, or legislators as to whether the character evidence rules
should apply to corporations.218 One thing that does seem clear is that
prior-act evidence can be used against a corporation in cases that
involve sexual assault by an employee.219 Yet this has little to do with
210. Id. at 883.
211. Kim, supra note 48, at 765–66.
212. Id. at 766 n.15.
213. Stafford v. United Farm Workers of Am., 656 P.2d 564, 568 (Cal. 1983) (alteration in
original) (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1104) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. 642 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Alaska 1982).
215. Id.
216. Kim, supra note 48, at 767 n.17.
217. E.g., El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 521 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1975).
218. Kim, supra note 48, at 763.
219. Cleveland v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“To allow
defendant corporation to shield itself from character evidence and disadvantage the victims of

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/5

26

Wagner: Criminal Corporate Character

2013]

CRIMINAL CORPORATE CHARACTER

1319

the status of the corporation and is based rather on the application of the
amended evidence rules regarding sexual assault.220 The next question
this Article addresses is whether the character evidence rules should be
amended to reflect the differences between corporations and
individuals. As one scholar has pointed out: “When a rule of exclusion
flies in the face of common sense and is based on dubious
generalizations about the danger of misdecision, it does not take much
to justify an exception that will let the trier hear more of the relevant
data.”221 I will explore how this idea applies in the case of corporations.
E. General Proposals to Change the Rules
Before embarking on a discussion of whether the rules barring
character evidence should be changed, I should first acknowledge that
the bar is already not absolute and in fact has been changed relatively
recently. Character evidence is often used in trials in both appropriate
and inappropriate (but unobjected to) ways.222 For example, allowing a
defendant to put on evidence that he has a character or character trait
that is inconsistent with having committed the charged offense is a true
exception to the idea that conduct cannot be proved by character.223 The
defense can use character evidence in part because this carries a reduced
danger of prejudice to the defendant and now the probative value224 is
more likely to outweigh its cost.225 Furthermore, even though the
concerns about unfair prejudice and misdecision are prominent
objections to character evidence,226 and even though this risk is highest
when the offense is reprehensible,227 Congress has already changed the
character laws in regard to rape and child molestation—considered two
of the most heinous crimes, according to at least one study.228
corporate sexual misconduct would be to emasculate the force of Rule 415.”).
220. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
221. Park, supra note 176, at 272.
222. Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and
Liability Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 851–54 (1998).
223. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075–76 (7th
Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds).
224. How probative a piece of evidence is means how effective the evidence is in proving
some disputed fact. Pardo, supra note 191, at 14–15.
225. Wydick, supra note 140, at 142.
226. See supra Section III.B.
227. See William Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic
Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 300 n.9 (1982).
228. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task, supra note 195, at 297 & n.75 (citing Sin: From
Murder to Laziness and Cutting in Line, a Darn-Close-to-Scientific Poll Ranks the Wrongs That
Flesh is Heir To, PEOPLE, Feb. 10, 1986, at 106, 108, available at http://www.people.com/peopl
e/archive/article/0,,20092922,00.html).
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Given these exceptions to the character evidence rules, the criteria
for the prohibition seem to involve balancing. Hence, the main question
in any particular situation is whether the benefits of excluding this type
of evidence outweigh the costs.229 Part of this determination must also
take into account that while evidence law is often focused on what
many consider to be the main purpose of trials (that is, fact-finding),
another purpose of trials can be the provision of incentives.230 As other
scholars have pointed out, if character evidence is actually more reliable
than has been historically assumed, it may be appropriate to lift the per
se ban and allow judges to make a case-by-case analysis.231
Notwithstanding the existence of relatively recent changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, such rules can be difficult to modify.
Indeed, rules of evidence can “survive even when there is no good
reason for their continued existence.”232 The advisory committee on the
rules of evidence, when referring to the rules regarding character, once
admitted that they “lie[] more in history and experience than in
logic.”233 This is particularly troublesome when much has changed
since the time when the rules were enacted. Professor David Leonard
has pointed out that “[w]hen a rule’s longevity can be measured in
terms of centuries rather than only years or decades, it is particularly
appropriate to undertake reform cautiously. The character rule presents
such an instance.”234 However accurate this warning may be generally,
it carries less weight when the rule under consideration is being applied
in a completely new manner. Corporations did not exist in their current
form centuries ago and there was no criminal liability imposed upon
them when the rule was constructed. Therefore, we should not feel
bound by the pedigree of the rule in this context and should rather
evaluate it neutrally on its own merits. Using the balancing criteria
mentioned above, I argue that the rule should be changed when applied
to corporations.
IV. CHARACTER EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS
This Part shows that the term “person” in Federal Rule of Evidence
404 (and its state corollaries) should be understood not to include
corporations. Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court established in 1819
229. Méndez, Character Evidence Reconsidered, supra note 172, at 873.
230. See generally Sanchirico, supra note 152 (examining the role that trials play in
providing incentives).
231. E.g., Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 234.
232. Tillers, supra note 141, at 782 (citation omitted).
233. Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404
advisory committee’s note) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1164.
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that a corporation was a “mere creature of law” that owed its existence
to government and hence only had the rights and privileges that the
government granted to it.235 If that were still the prominent view, there
would not be as much uncertainty about the situation. The argument
would likely go that only those rights specifically given to corporations
by the government are the ones it possesses, and that because the
protection of the character evidence ban was not specifically extended
to corporations, it should not apply to them. Over the course of the last
century, however, corporations have been given many constitutionally
protected rights236 and have also been treated as persons in other
contexts. I argue that when it comes to character evidence rules, they
should not be viewed as such. The reasons are consistent with the aims
of corporate criminal law and evidence law, including both the search
for truth and the desire to establish an optimal incentives structure.
I will begin by describing how the rules apply to an individual and
then how definitively lifting the prohibition for corporations specifically
would affect the prosecution of a corporation in the same circumstance.
The rules currently forbid using the fact that a defendant—say, a car
salesman—has a record of falsely representing the condition of the cars
he sells to establish that he is the kind of person who would
intentionally misrepresent the condition of a car and, hence, did so on a
particular occasion.237 Suppose instead that CarMax, the large used-car
resale corporation, had an unwritten de facto policy requiring its
salespeople to consistently hide the defects in a car and, after fixing the
odometer, the employees indeed lied about the number of miles a car
had been driven.238 I argue that evidence about CarMax’s past actions of
deception should be allowed in a new prosecution for fraud. In addition
to this hypothetical example, there are many real-world examples in
which the character of a corporation should be used. For example, in
May of 2010, for the fourth time in less than a year, Johnson & Johnson
recalled 136 million bottles of children’s medicine, prompting the
government to accuse them of “systemic failures and a culture of
mediocrity.”239 In a prosecution for something like negligent homicide,
the prosecution should be able to argue that defendants were negligent
235. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
236. See Sheley, supra note 8, at 17.
237. See Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 222 (criticizing the prohibition
on the use of character evidence when applied to individual, unethical car salesmen).
238. This is merely a hypothetical example—I have no information that CarMax does or
ever has behaved in this manner.
239. Sepinwall, supra note 5, at 413–14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Susan
Heavey, Storm over J&J’s Child Drug Recall Only Grows, REUTERS.COM (May 27, 2010,
4:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/27/us-johnsonandjohnson-recall-idUSTRE64
P3UD20100527).
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in the past and that it is therefore more likely that they were negligent
this time. Another good example concerns Massey Energy:
Massey Energy provides the stark example of a company
culture directly contributing to the death of twenty-nine
men. On April 5, 2010, “a powerful explosion tore through
the Upper Big Branch mine, owned by Massey Energy.”
The explosion killed twenty-nine miners and left one
seriously injured. A spark from a mining tool ignited a
pocket of methane, and the exploding methane eventually
ignited coal dust. The explosion traveled through more than
two miles of mine. An independent commission conducted
extensive analysis and investigation before concluding that
the explosion was caused by extensive safety violations and
was “a completely predictable result for a company that
ignored basic safety standards and put too much faith in its
own mythology.” The safety lapses were so extensive that
the commission concludes they could “only be explained in
the context of a culture in which wrongdoing became
acceptable,
where
deviation
became
the
norm.” . . . . Methane gas, coal dust and a spark caused the
explosion; the culture of Massey Energy caused the
presence of methane gas, coal dust and a spark.240
In a prosecution for this explosion or a subsequent incident, the jury
should be able to evaluate the evidence of past actions and determine its
significance on whether the company behaved in a similar manner. As
has been pointed out by other scholars, “[t]he corporation should be
held accountable under the criminal law if the corporation, by
establishing organizational cultures that tacitly countenance crime, is
the real party-in-interest rather than the so-called ‘bad apple.’”241
Character evidence may be quite useful in determining if the
corporation has established this type of culture, potentially making the
evidence very probative. For several decades, scholars have called for
the introduction of character evidence when it is more probative than
prejudicial.242 I claim that in corporate settings, it is in fact generally
more probative than prejudicial for reasons ranging from the reliability
240. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 10–11 (citations omitted).
241. Pouncy, supra note 40, at 112. A possible counterargument would be that to the extent
juries (and even judges) suffer from hindsight bias in tort and criminal cases, legal decision
makers are in some ways too likely to find liability. My proposal could, therefore, slightly
exacerbate the issue. For a discussion of hindsight bias in this context and a summary of
relevant studies, see generally Manta, Reasonable Copyright, supra note 125.
242. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 143, at 883.
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of the evidence due to the corporate structure, to the historical oddity
that resulted in the initial ban, to the increased ability of the corporation
to defend itself, and to corporations’ intentional development of their
character. As to this last point, “modern corporations develop distinctive
personae through increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques.”243
They specifically do so to maximize profits; therefore, it is more
appropriate to hold them accountable for all aspects of that character
given that changing the incentives could greatly affect how they act
subsequently. Defense lawyers also know about and use a corporation’s
character and image in litigation when attempting to project a positive
image of the corporation,244 which gives courts greater justification to
hold them accountable for it.
Historically, early courts rooted the prohibition against character
evidence in the “jealous regard for the liberty of the individual.”245
These circumstances are very different when there is no individual and
“liberty” is not in question.246 Further, as pointed out previously, the
rules regarding character evidence are at least in part based upon shaky
understandings of human nature,247 making them inapplicable to
corporations even absent the shakiness.
While rules of evidence have been changed at least in part due to the
status of the victim,248 the status of the defendant should also be a
relevant consideration. Evidence rules and procedures were not only
constructed originally for individuals,249 but it is also true that “false
convictions of corporations are not as problematic to society as false
convictions of individuals.”250 Furthermore, “[t]he unique difficulties
associated with detecting, investigating, and proving corporate
criminality suggest . . . that the number of false corporate convictions is
already very low.”251 Not only is that the case, but one must also
consider the magnitude of the risk of recidivism. As mentioned, since
1995, the Federal Rules of Evidence have allowed character evidence to
prove action in conformity therewith in sexual assault cases and child
molestation cases, including civil cases.252 This use of character
evidence was in part justified by the indications of high levels of
243. Brickey, supra note 7, at 20 (citation omitted).
244. Kim, supra note 48, at 797.
245. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (N.Y. 1901).
246. Most blatantly, a corporation cannot be placed in jail.
247. Wydick, supra note 140, at 125.
248. For a discussion of rape shield laws, see Park, supra note 176, at 275–77.
249. Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate
Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 263 (1991).
250. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1512.
251. Id. at 1513 (citation omitted).
252. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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recidivism from such perpetrators.253 Researchers have noticed a
similarly high level of consistency in corporate behavior, meaning that
corporations tend to act either ethically or dubiously on a regular
basis,254 and often commit the same or very similar offenses repeatedly.
Some scholars have even argued for applying a “three strikes” rule to
corporations in an attempt to address recidivism.255 Therefore, the same
justification that was used to admit character evidence in sexual assault
cases can be used to admit it in corporate criminal cases, and in fact the
argument to do so is potentially stronger in the corporate setting.
As pointed out previously, some have attacked the rules allowing
character evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases on the
grounds that there is “no principled distinction” between those
defendants and other potential defendants that would justify disparate
treatment.256 My proposal does not face this obstacle because there are
significant differences between corporations and individuals, including
when it comes to general recidivism rates, potential consequences they
could each encounter outside the criminal law, the different penalties
that individuals face, corporations’ increased ability to defend
themselves, and the different decision making processes they each
experience. Furthermore, the likelihood of unfair prejudice is much
higher in sexual crimes—particularly in child-molestation cases—than
it is in virtually any corporate crime. At least one study has confirmed
what most people would assume: nonviolent theft offenses are usually
viewed as much less heinous than crimes such as murder or rape.257
These results have led at least one scholar to recommend that theft
offenses would make a good candidate to begin changing the character
evidence rules.258 My proposal not only limits the change primarily to
nonviolent, non-heinous types of crimes,259 but also distinguishes
between significantly different defendants.
Another argument for allowing corporate character evidence to
prove action in conformity with that character is based on continuity,
which refers to the fact that character evidence is used both before and
after the guilt phase of a trial. Corporate criminal liability is so broad
that prosecutors must pick and choose from many companies that
253. Goodman, supra note 139, at 85.
254. Ripken, supra note 29, at 134; Kim, supra note 48, at 800.
255. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 49.
256. See supra Section III.B; Colb, supra note 145, at 942.
257. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 297 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE SEVERITY OF CRIME (1984), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sc.pdf).
258. See id. at 301–02.
259. This is due to the nature of most corporate criminal actions.
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technically qualify for prosecution.260 Attorney General Eric Holder’s
memorandum giving guidance for prosecutors in corporate matters
contained nine factors that should be considered when determining
whether to prosecute, including “the corporation’s history of similar
conduct.”261 Past acts or behavior, therefore, must come into play, and
the same evidence that is kept from the jury through character evidence
rules is used to determine if the case even goes to the jury. On the other
side of the trial, sentencing guidelines indicate that an important factor
to consider is the corporate ethos and whether it supports a corporate
culture that encourages compliance with the law.262 This type of
information is also supplied by character evidence. Thus, courts are
directed to view the very same information they are denied during the
guilt phases of a trial to determine the appropriate punishment during
the sentencing phase. It seems logical that the evidence that is required
to be considered both before and after a trial be available for
consideration during a trial.
Another ground for allowing character evidence revolves around the
idea of fairness. A possible argument for disallowing corporate
character evidence is that it may not be fair to the corporation or its
shareholders. One reason this may be viewed as unfair, as discussed in
cases dating back to 1684 that have excluded character evidence, has
been the possibility of unfair surprise.263 Their institutional memory and
legal assistance, however, would allow corporations to anticipate the
use of this evidence. Unlike an individual who may have no idea that
his past acts could be used against him in court,264 a corporation would
likely have experienced enough trial or court proceedings to be aware of
the possibility. Further, their attorneys would obviously know and point
out this possibility.
Introducing character evidence may also not be fair to shareholders.
While it remains an open question whether having criminal liability for
corporations at all is fair to shareholders, if we set that aside and ask
only whether the character evidence rules themselves are fair to those
actors, the answer seems to be yes. One could argue that the key to
fairness to the investors is whether information regarding the risks and
260. See Baer, supra note 14, at 3.
261. Sheley, supra note 8, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Memorandum
from the Deputy Attorney General to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June
16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/chargingcorps.PDF).
262. See Sheyn, supra note 45, at 15.
263. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1185.
264. One suspects, however, that most people with no knowledge of evidence law would
assume that their past acts could be used.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 5

1326

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

rewards possible from an investment in Corporation X is known at the
time of investment.265 With this rule change, the risks will be known
since all past acts will be assumed to be admissible evidence in future
prosecutions and hence raise the likelihood of conviction and lower the
appropriate stock price. Therefore, even though it may have a negative
impact on stock prices and potentially cost the corporation money, it
would still be fair to the shareholders. One last point in relation to
fairness is that if bad character evidence is admissible, the corporation
would, of course, have the opportunity to introduce evidence of good
corporate character that may negate more unfortunate implications.266
Another problem mentioned above in the context of general
objections to character evidence, namely the misleading “coincidence”
factor,267 also has reduced impact on corporations. In the case of a
corporation, a known environmental polluter may become a suspect if a
new pollutant is discovered in a nearby waterway. Yet the danger is not
as great as for individuals for several reasons. First, the corporation is
likely much more capable of presenting to the jury the fact that it was
investigated because of the prior incident and therefore there was no
coincidence. Second, a corporation has an increased ability to
investigate the incident itself and present alternative suspects much
more readily than an individual. Finally, it is possible that this potential
problem could be viewed as a benefit in that it will prompt corporations
to set a premium on avoiding the first incident of criminal behavior.
This may or may not be advantageous given the possibility of
overdeterrence,268 but it is certainly more advantageous than for an
individual.
The distinctions between individuals and corporations argue in favor
of admitting character evidence in more ways than one, including as
related to the concept of personality traits itself. As pointed out above,
one problem with the idea of personality traits is the seemingly tiny
amount of situational difference that can cause variation in a person’s
behavior.269 This problem is mitigated with corporations due to the
nature of the CID Structure.270 Because information has to be shared
before decisions are made, but not every minute detail is transmitted in
265. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259,
1268 (1982).
266. See, e.g., Norwest Bank N.M., N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 981 P.2d 1215, 1226 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming the admission of evidence by Chrysler to “rebut[] Plaintiff’s evidence of
Chrysler’s bad corporate character”).
267. See supra Section III.B; Park, supra note 176, at 273.
268. Here overdeterrence means, for example, the possibility that a corporation will spend
$100 to avoid a violation that would have resulted in $50 worth of damage.
269. See supra Section III.B; Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 228.
270. See supra Part III.
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this process, corporations as entities cannot be aware of the same level
of situational detail of which a person may be aware and that may affect
her. Small situational differences would thus never gain significance,
would not cause a change in corporate behavior, and would lead to more
predictability. A person, however, may be motivated to change his
behavior by something so small that he would not even be aware of it.
For example, a man with a violent disposition may not assault another
individual because the latter reminded him of his son in some way that
the man did not even recognize. A corporation is not capable of
distinctions like that due to the fact that for corporate action, the
information is synthesized through several people. This requires
presentation of the information and hence cannot go unnoticed or
remain subconscious.
In the same vein, when considering the harm caused, one must take
into account the fact that the size of many corporations and their
potentially widespread misconduct may contribute to increased harm
when compared with the discrete actions of individual actors.271
Different actions taken in remote locations can combine to result in
more harmful consequences than the individual actions would seem to
indicate.272 This supports my argument that the rule should be changed
because it would be far more difficult, if not impossible, to use
information of distant acts by the corporation in the current case without
changing the rules of evidence. As pointed out previously, it may be
possible to introduce this evidence on a different basis, but this is far
from clear and may result in a large amount of uncertainty and
increased appellate costs.
A final distinguishing feature of a large corporation is the fact that it
can survive for many generations, which is often referred to as its
“permanence.”273 A corporation’s permanence is another reason the rule
against character evidence should not apply to it due to the increased
potential harm. The fact that a corporation may be around for several
generations increases society’s need to ensure that it complies with legal
requirements. If it is aware that crimes it commits today could be used
against it in the future, there is an increased incentive to avoid not only
future crimes but the initial crime as well. Compounding the differences
I have discussed between corporations and individuals is that society is
unlikely to look kindly upon lenient treatment for corporations, and the
legal system risks its legitimacy when the public loses faith in it.
Erroneous fact-finding may affect not only the parties to the trial but
also the public at large in that society could lose “confidence in the
271. Sheley, supra note 8, at 35.
272. See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (discussing the Massey Energy case).
273. Kim, supra note 48, at 788.
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civil- and criminal-justice systems, creating a very real risk of
disorder.”274 People can become less trusting, however, both if too
much and if too little evidence is allowed before the jury, because either
circumstance has the potential to affect the judicial search for truth.
Jurors themselves may feel deceived if after they acquit a corporation in
a close case they find out that the corporation has been convicted of the
same crime several times before.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that a corporation should not be considered a “person”
when it comes to the prohibition on introducing a person’s character to
show that he acted in conformity with it. Lawyers should argue that the
rule does not apply, judges should concur with this argument, and
legislators should perhaps amend the rules for the sake of clarification. I
have pointed out that it is possible that past acts are more reliable
indicators for corporations than they are for people. There is also a
lowered cost of error in admitting that evidence, because corporations
do not face incarceration. They also have an increased ability to show
rehabilitation (in that a change in policy would be documented with a
corporation, but not with a person). Furthermore, corporations are
typically better represented in court.
In the past, applying character evidence rules to corporations has
faced some opposition because principles of human autonomy and
respect militate for limiting them to individuals,275 but this Article has
added to the discourse by illuminating the relationship between
character rules and the general purposes of corporate criminal law and
evidence law. As I pointed out, one of the primary goals of criminal law
is deterrence. Using character evidence for corporations more
effectively achieves this goal. Not only does it make conviction more
likely for corporations that have previously committed crimes—thereby
encouraging them to avoid possible criminal conduct from now on—it
also leads corporations without a criminal history to maintain that
record, since any crime could have more long-term consequences than it
would if character evidence were prohibited. Allowing character
evidence for corporations also achieves both of the key goals of
evidence law: revealing the truth in court and establishing an efficient
incentive structure that facilitates legal behavior. Considering the
increased likelihood of accomplishing all of these important goals,
corporate character evidence should be admitted in criminal trials.
Given that “[a] company’s culture is its character, and that character
274. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1192.
275. See Kim, supra note 48, at 779.
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influences its actions, good and bad,”276 it should also influence juries.

276. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 11 (citation omitted).
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